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The dollarization of bank deposits and credit is widespread in developing countries, 
resulting in varying degrees of currency mismatches in domestic financial 
intermediation, which in turn may accentuate balance sheet problems and thus 
financial fragility.  It is widely argued that flexible exchange rate regimes encourage 
banks to match dollar-denominated liabilities with a corresponding amount of 
dollar-denominated assets, ameliorating currency mismatches.  Does the behavior of 
dollar deposits and credit in financially dollarized economies support that 
presumption?  A new database on deposit and credit dollarization in developing and 
transition countries is assembled and used to address this question.  Empirical results 
suggest that, if anything, floating regimes seem to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, 
currency mismatches in domestic financial intermediation, as those regimes seem to 
encourage deposit dollarization more strongly than they encourage matching via 
credit dollarization. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Partial dollarization, defined as the holding by residents of a significant share of their 
assets and liabilities in the form of foreign-currency-denominated instruments, is 
prevalent in many developing and transition economies.1  This phenomenon, which has 
historically been a response to economic turmoil and high inflation, has persisted – even 
increased – in various parts of the developing world during the last decade, despite 
growing price stability.  Financial intermediation in particular has become heavily 
dollarized in many countries.  This process of financial dollarization has been reflected 
in varying patterns of dollarization of bank deposits and loans, which in turn have 
influenced the extent of currency mismatches in financial intermediation. 
  In general, the currency mismatches of banks and firms, and the resulting foreign 
currency exposure, are seen as a source of financial fragility.  One of the debates about 
the causes of those mismatches relates to the exchange rate regime.  There are two views 
on the links between regimes and mismatches – in particular, on the question of whether 
greater flexibility encourages hedging.  The majority view (e.g. Burnside, Eichenbaum, 
and Rebelo 1999, Mishkin 1996, Obstfeld 1998) would appear to be that fixed exchange 
rates encourage currency mismatches because banks and firms do not hedge their dollar 
liabilities: they overlook the need to limit their open foreign currency positions, since 
they believe themselves to be immune to exchange rate fluctuations given the 
commitment from the authorities to defend the peg.2  Therefore, the argument goes, 
floating exchange rates would encourage banks and firms to match dollar liabilities with 
a corresponding quantity of dollar assets, as they seek to limit their exposure to 
                                                           
1 Following the usual vocabulary, this paper employs the terms “dollar” when referring to any 
foreign currency and “peso” when referring to any domestic currency.  Also, the term 
“dollarization” in this paper does not refer to the adoption of a foreign currency as legal tender 
(“full dollarization”). 
2 It would also appear that this is the conventional wisdom among international organizations 
when explaining the Asian crisis.  For instance, the 68th Annual Report of the BIS (1998, p. 124) 
states that “long-standing policies of fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rates probably nurtured a 
misperception of exchange rate risk.  With a flexible exchange rate, and frequent movements in 
both directions, firms and households learn from their daily experience to take account of 
exchange risk.”  Furthermore, in an IMF volume, Johnston, Darbar, and Echeverría (1999, p. 290) 
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exchange risk.  An exchange rate that fluctuates more freely would constantly remind 
banks and firms of the importance of limiting their unhedged dollar liabilities.   
  On the other hand, there is a notable minority view (e.g. Eichengreen and 
Hausmann 1999, McKinnon 2001), which argues that greater flexibility increases the cost 
of hedging and therefore may not lead to lower currency mismatches.  This view 
emphasizes that the cost of insurance against exchange risk goes up with exchange rate 
volatility.  Insofar as floating regimes lead to greater volatility, therefore, they may raise 
the cost of insurance and result in less hedging, rather than more. 
  In the context of dollarized banking systems, this debate centers more 
prominently on the currency composition of deposits and credits.  An implication of the 
majority view would be that floating regimes would encourage banks to match dollar 
deposits with dollar loans.  Note, however, that greater exchange rate flexibility also 
enhances the attractiveness of dollar deposits as households seek to insure themselves 
against currency risk.  Whether banks can and will respond to this further increase in 
dollar deposits by further increasing dollar loans is an open question.  Substituting 
foreign-currency-denominated loans for domestic-currency-denominated loans trades 
one source of risk (default risk, reflecting the fact that sudden depreciations leave some 
firms unable to repay) for another (currency risk).  As the minority view would put it, 
the cost of dollar credit as insurance against currency risk is greater default risk.  Banks 
may have good reasons to regard it as undesirable to move too far to one or the other 
extreme of this tradeoff.  Flexible exchange rates thus may encourage deposit 
dollarization more strongly than they encourage credit dollarization.  Currency 
mismatches may therefore be greater, not lower, under floating regimes. For all these 
reasons, the overall effect of greater exchange rate flexibility on credit and deposit 
dollarization, and thus on currency mismatches in financial intermediation, is an 
empirical question. 
  In most developing economies, credits and deposits account for a significant 
portion of total bank assets and liabilities.  Therefore, currency mismatches in financial 
intermediation may greatly shape the overall foreign currency exposure of dollarized 
                                                           
state that unhedged borrowing emerged out of “expectations that relatively stable exchange rates 
would be maintained indefinitely.”   3
banking systems.  However, despite the obvious relevance of the topic, there has been 
little theoretical work and exactly zero systematic empirical work on the determinants of 
the currency composition of bank assets and liabilities in dollarized countries.  Most of 
the partial dollarization literature has focused on the dollarization of currency 
transactions (currency substitution) rather than the dollarization of financial 
intermediation.3  In particular, while the dollarization of deposits has been extensively 
studied in the context of currency substitution, the dollarization of bank loan portfolios 
has received scant theoretical attention and no systematic empirical analysis, even 
though deposit and credit dollarization are the two sides of the same (dollar) coin.   
Moreover, there does not appear to be a single systematic empirical study, as far as I am 
aware, on the links between the exchange rate and bank currency mismatches in 
dollarized economies or elsewhere in the developing world.  This paper attempts to 
contribute toward filling these gaps. 
  To analyze the effects of exchange rate flexibility on financial dollarization and 
currency mismatches in financial intermediation, I assemble a new database on 
dollarization.  Its first component is data on dollar-denominated bank credit and 
deposits in a large number of developing and transition economies for the past two 
decades.  Its second component is information on bank regulations in the same sample 
of dollarized countries.  Using these data, I study the impact of the exchange rate regime 
on credit dollarization, deposit dollarization, and currency mismatches, explicitly 
controlling for the institutional and regulatory framework.  I use alternative variable 
definitions, different estimation procedures, a battery of sensitivity tests, and deal with 
potential endogeneity. 
  I find little support for the view that flexible exchange rate regimes reduce 
currency mismatches in domestic financial intermediation.  If anything, the opposite 
seems to be true.  Deposit dollarization is significantly greater under floating regimes, 
while credit dollarization does not appear to differ significantly across regimes.  Since 
exchange rate flexibility encourages deposit dollarization much more strongly than it 
encourages credit dollarization, floating exchange rates result in greater deposit-credit 
                                                           
3 For surveys on the extensive currency substitution literature, see Calvo and Végh (1996) and 
Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994).   4
mismatches.  These results hold across different variable definitions, estimation 
methods, and robustness checks.4  
  Insofar as currency mismatches in financial intermediation can significantly 
shape the overall foreign currency exposure of banking systems in dollarized economies, 
these results, if correct, are a blow to the widely believed presumption that floating 
regimes alleviate such exposures.  And if overall currency mismatches indeed 
undermine financial stability – as most economist believe – then these results suggest 
that exchange rate flexibility may not necessarily enhance safe and sound financial 
systems in developing countries, which would have important implications for 
exchange rate policy.   
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 outlines the 
theoretical links between exchange rate flexibility and financial dollarization (based on a 
simple portfolio model presented in Appendix A), as well as the main methodological 
issues to address in analyzing such links.  Section 3 introduces the new dollarization 
database and other data used.  Section 4 presents empirical evidence on the impact of 
exchange rate regimes on dollarization and currency mismatches in financial 
intermediation.  Section 5 discusses the implications of the results as well as some 
caveats.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2  Conceptual and Empirical Considerations 
 
2.1  A Simple Conceptual Framework 
 
How does greater exchange rate flexibility affect credit and deposit dollarization?  From 
a theoretical point of view, the answer can be ambiguous, due to potentially offsetting 
                                                           
4 Before proceeding, an important caveat is in order.  This paper focuses on the effects of 
exchange rate regimes on currency mismatch in domestic financial intermediation.  A complete 
assessment of the impact of regimes on overall bank currency mismatches is not the main focus of 
this paper, as it would require additional data on hedging in insurance markets against currency 
risk and on the currency denomination of other components of bank balance sheets.  These data 
are unfortunately scarce.  I do touch on those issues, but in a more limited way, as detailed 
below.  I elaborate on this and other caveats below.   5
effects of exchange risk and default risk.  Appendix A presents a simple model of two-
currency banking under exchange rate and default uncertainty.5  T h e  m o d e l  
incorporates two main assumptions.  First, it assumes that ex ante lending and deposit 
rates do not fully reflect depreciation and default shocks, so that ex post returns may be 
affected by those shocks.  For example, a depreciation shock may occur between the time 
of peso loan disbursement and the time of loan repayment and may therefore reduce the 
ex post return (in dollar terms) on the peso-denominated loan.  Second, it assumes that 
agents are risk averse, which is crucial for analyzing the impact of uncertainty on 
deposit and credit dollarization.  With these two assumptions, it is straightforward to 
assess the impact of the volatility of depreciation and default shocks on dollarization.  
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, the model further assumes that loans and 
deposits are purely supply-determined.  Even under these strong assumptions, it turns 
out that exchange rate uncertainty and default risk create ambiguity about the overall 
impact of exchange rate flexibility on dollarization. 
  In the model, the bank determines its optimal amounts of peso and dollar loans 
taking into account depreciation risk (which affects the ex-post rate of return in peso 
loans) and dollar loan default risk (which affects the ex-post rate of return of dollar 
loans).6  A higher variance of depreciation unambiguously reduces the issue of peso 
loans, which become riskier and therefore less attractive.  However, more volatile 
depreciation has two offsetting effects on the supply of dollar loans: a positive effect 
based on expected returns, and a negative effect based on risk.  Depreciation shocks 
increase the relative ex post return of dollar assets, but the volatility of such shocks 
increases uncertainty, which the risk-averse bank dislikes.  In particular, the higher the 
existing levels of dollar lending, the stronger the negative risk effect. 
  The damaging effects of sharp depreciations on firms’ ability to repay dollar 
loans during recent developing-country crises suggest that dollar loan default is a 
function of exchange rate depreciation.  Extended to include this source of endogenous 
dollar loan default, the model suggests additional effects of exchange rate volatility on 
                                                           
5 The portfolio approach to banking was pioneered by Pyle (1971), and Hart and Jaffee (1974).  Ize 
and Levy-Yeyati (1998) use a related framework to analyze financial dollarization. 
6 For simplicity, peso loan default is not considered.   6
lending.  In general, the negative, offsetting effect of volatility on dollar lending is 
unambiguously stronger than in the exogenous loan default case. As a result, the 
increase of loan dollarization due to greater exchange rate volatility is unambiguously 
lower.7  Again, the intuition is simple:  depreciation shocks create an incentive for the 
bank to dollarize its loan portfolio; however, insofar as such shocks also increase dollar 
loan default risk, they also create an additional incentive for the bank to reduce the 
supply of dollar loans. 
  A similar framework can be used to tackle the depositor’s problem.  The 
representative depositor faces two sources of uncertainty:  depreciation risk and deposit 
loss risk.  Depreciation risk affects the ex post return on peso deposits.  Deposit loss risk, 
based on the inability of the bank to repay deposits in the presence of insolvency 
problems (which are themselves a function of dollar loan default), affects the return of 
both peso and dollar deposits.  This risk may be greater for dollar deposits, however, 
because they are also subject to forced convertibility and confiscation risk in periods of 
bank distress.8  I normalize peso deposit loss risk to zero, and only consider the dollar-
to-peso deposit loss risk differential, which affects the return to dollar deposits. 
  As in the bank’s case, more volatile depreciation implies an unambiguously 
negative effect on peso deposits and two offsetting effects (one based on expected 
returns, one based on risk) on dollar deposits.  However, with endogenous loan default, 
the potential increase in deposit dollarization due to greater exchange rate volatility is 
unambiguously lower.9 
  The overall implications are the following: 
•  Greater exchange rate flexibility may increase credit dollarization, but offsetting 
effects are present.  In particular, the more sensitive dollar loan non-performance 
is to depreciation, the weaker is the positive impact of exchange rate volatility on 
dollar lending. 
                                                           
7 The precise effect depends upon the elasticity of dollar loan default to the rate of depreciation. 
8 This type of risk is illustrated by the experience of several Latin American countries during the 
1980s, when dollar deposits were either frozen or converted into pesos at a highly depreciated 
exchange rate.  Argentina’s 2001-2002 corralito is a reminder that restrictions on deposits can also 
occur nowadays. 
9 Again, the precise effect depends upon the elasticity of perceived dollar deposit loss risk to bank 
solvency problems, as well as the elasticity of dollar loan default to depreciation.   7
•  Greater exchange rate flexibility may also increase deposit dollarization.  Deposit 
loss risk weakens this effect if such risk is perceived to be greater for dollar 
deposits. 
•  The overall impact of exchange rate flexibility on mismatches is ambiguous a 
priori.  An increase in mismatches is more likely the larger the elasticity of dollar 
loan non-performance to depreciation and the lower the perceived dollar deposit 
loss risk.  
 
2.2  Empirical and Methodological Issues 
 
Understanding the links between exchange rate flexibility and currency mismatches in 
financial intermediation is ultimately an empirical issue.  As mentioned above, a 
potential implication of the majority view is that floating rate regimes reduce those 
mismatches.  Testing such implication is equivalent to testing whether, compared to 
more rigid regimes, floating regimes lead to higher credit dollarization vis-à-vis deposit 
dollarization, thus reducing currency mismatches in financial intermediation.  The 
ultimate goal of this paper is thus to estimate the following relationship: 
  β γε = ++ '' it it it it Dollarization ExchangeRate Controls  (1) 
  Dollarization stands for a measure of either credit or deposit dollarization, or for 
the corresponding deposit-credit mismatch.  Exchange Rate stands for a set of variables 
related to the exchange rate regime.  The term Controls represents a vector of other 
explanatory variables affecting dollarization (to be detailed later).  Finally, ε  is a 
disturbance term. 
  There are three main methodological issues to consider in attempting to estimate 
this relationship:  a) inconsistency between the de jure and de facto nature of exchange 
rate regimes and cross-regime contamination; b) the persistence of dollarization; and c) 
endogeneity. 
 Differences  between  de jure and de facto regimes clearly matter: for instance, 
countries where authorities claim to have a flexible regime but actively limit exchange 
rate fluctuations may exhibit different patterns of dollarization and mismatch from those 
where authorities act consistently with the reported regime.  In addition, the periods   8
around regime changes deserve careful attention.  If residents expect the collapse of a 
peg and a large devaluation, they may reduce their holding of peso assets.  More 
importantly, the collapse of the peg may generate a burst of dollarization (particularly 
deposit dollarization), which can be mistakenly regarded as being caused by the 
subsequent flexible regimes.  This problem of regime change “contamination” needs to 
be accounted for. 
  On the other hand, financial dollarization appears to be persistent.  Countries 
that suffered high inflation in the past may still have high levels of dollarization, despite 
years of inflation stability.  This is the case for several Latin American countries.10  
Hysteresis may therefore have an important role in explaining dollarization, which may 
greatly transcend regime changes. 
  A final methodological issue is the problem of endogeneity.  The presence of 
dollar-denominated assets in financial intermediation increases the substitutability of 
assets and makes the exchange rate more sensitive to portfolio reallocations.  Thus, 
dollarization can result in a more volatile exchange rate and increase the need for a 
flexible regime.  On the other hand, the exchange rate regime is a policy decision, partly 
based on the level of financial dollarization.  Therefore, the direction of causality may 
run in the opposite direction: for example, countries with high dollarization and/or high 




3.1 Dollarization  Data 
 
The unbalanced panel data set assembled for purposes of this paper consists of monthly 
observations, mainly from the early 1990s to the first months of 2000.  Data on the 
aggregate volume of deposit money banks’ foreign-currency-denominated deposits of 
                                                           
10 For example, dollarization in Argentina, which greatly accelerated during periods of high 
inflation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, remained high throughout the late 1990s, despite very 
low inflation during that period.   9
residents are available for 92 developing and transition economies.  Data on the 
aggregate volume of deposit money banks’ foreign-currency-denominated credit to the 
resident private sector are available for 40 developing and transition economies, almost 
all of which also have dollar deposits data.  This sample of countries covers all regions of 
the world.  The time span varies across countries, with some having data from as early 
as 1975 and some having data only from about 1995 onwards.12  The main sources are 
data used by the IMF in constructing its International Financial Statistics, as well as 
printed Central Bank bulletins from the monetary authorities of several countries.   
Appendix B presents more detailed information on country sample, data definitions, 
availability, and sources.  These data allow for the construction of currency mismatch 
measures for 37 countries. 
  I define dollarization in two ways.  The first definition emphasizes the behavior of 
credit and deposit dollarization by scaling dollar credit and deposits by total credit and 
deposits, respectively.  The second definition provides a sense of the magnitude of credit 
and deposit dollarization by scaling dollar credit and deposits by total assets and 
liabilities, respectively.  The first definition focuses on portfolio allocation decisions, 
while the second focuses on the relative importance of the financial dollarization 
process.13  Given these considerations, the dollarization ratios constructed are: 
•  Credit dollarization ratio.  This is measured as:  a) the ratio of dollar credit to the 
private sector over total credit to the private sector; or as b) the ratio of dollar 
credit to the private sector over total assets. 
•  Deposit dollarization ratio.  This is measured as:  a) the ratio of dollar deposits 
over total deposits; or as b) the ratio of dollar deposits over total liabilities. 
•  Deposit-credit mismatch ratio.  This is measured as the difference between dollar 
deposits and dollar credit divided by total bank liabilities.  
  Some data limitations should be noted.  While bank credit to the private sector 
represents the bulk of total bank credit for most countries, in a few transition economies 
                                                           
11 Poirson (2001) reports that countries with higher deposit dollarization are more likely to adopt 
a fixed exchange rate regime. 
12 Frequent changes in the format of primary sources are a major reason for the diverse time 
coverage.   10
credit to the public sector is considerable.  More importantly, although private credit 
and deposits represent the bulk of domestic assets and liabilities, as well as an important 
component of total assets and liabilities, the analysis would greatly benefit from the 
inclusion of data on other components of bank balance sheets.14  Finally, data on 
domestic- and foreign-currency lending and deposit interest rates are important in 
assessing the role of interest rate differentials for financial dollarization, but they are 
unfortunately scarce.15 
  While the dollarization data are available at a monthly frequency, several 
explanatory variables are not (e.g. World Bank macroeconomic data, regulatory data, or 
exchange rate regimes, detailed below).  I therefore convert the dollarization data to 
annual frequency in the empirical analysis below.  As a result, the annualized data end 
in 1999.16 
 
3.2  Regulatory Arrangements Data 
 
Analyzing the determinants of dollarization requires controlling for the institutional and 
regulatory arrangements under which banking takes place.  For instance, several 
dollarized economies temporarily restricted dollar deposits and/or credit heavily.17  
                                                           
13 As it is shown below, it turns out that the use of both definitions of dollarization yields very 
similar results. 
14 In particular, it would be useful to have data on foreign assets and liabilities in dollars, as banks 
could have open dollar positions with non-residents to finance dollar lending to domestic firms.  
In any event, the focus of this paper on dollarization and mismatches in domestic financial 
intermediation ameliorates these limitations. 
15 I have been able to assemble information on these variables for a more limited sample of 
countries.  There are data on the dollarization of credit to the public and other sectors for up to 29 
countries, data on the dollarization of banks’ foreign assets and liabilities for 22 countries, and 
data on the dollarization of banks’ total assets and liabilities for 7 countries. In addition, there are 
data for deposit and lending interest rates in pesos and dollars for 15 countries.  All of these data 
have different degrees of country coverage.  Unless stated otherwise, these additional data are 
not usually employed in the empirical analysis below, given that they do not cover a large 
enough number of countries. 
16 Finally, there are a few instances in which values for dollar credit or deposits are equal to zero, 
principally when the data come from electronic sources. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether 
this means that the actual value was zero (e.g. values for dollar credit were zero because dollar 
credit was prohibited) or whether the data were missing.  Therefore, I only work with strictly 
positive values of the relevant variables, and set any zero value to missing. 
17 Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru during the 1980s are the best-known examples.   11
Insofar as those restrictions were usually accompanied by pegged rates, one could 
mistakenly attribute a low level of dollarization to the fixed regime.   Similarly, 
regulations may freely allow dollar deposits but restrict dollar credit, thus creating a 
mismatch that has little to do with banks’ optimizing behavior.  Moreover, some 
countries restrict dollar deposits or credit to some sectors (e.g. residents that earn foreign 
exchange from abroad), thus affecting the pattern of financial dollarization above and 
beyond the true impact of the exchange rate regime.18  And the fact that the regulatory 
framework can be time-varying renders econometric techniques such as fixed effects 
unable to fully control for it. 
  To my knowledge, there is no source of comprehensive regulatory information 
on financial dollarization to date.  The most comprehensive database on bank regulation 
and supervision currently available, compiled by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001), says 
nothing about dollarization or currency mismatch regulations.  To overcome these data 
limitations, I gathered qualitative information on the regulatory arrangements of 
dollarization from various issues of the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions and other IMF publications.  The information collected allows for 
the construction of two binary indicators: 
•  Whether a country allows residents’ dollar deposit accounts freely or with minor 
conditions, as opposed to severely restricting them, limiting them to certain 
residents (e.g. individuals or firms that earn foreign exchange), or prohibiting 
them. 
•  Whether a country allows dollar lending freely or with minor conditions, as 
opposed to severely restricting them, limiting them to certain residents (e.g. 
individuals or firms that earn foreign exchange), or prohibiting them. 
 
3.3  Exchange Rate Regime Data 
 
I employ the standard exchange rate regime classification widely used in the empirical 
literature and based on the regime reported by monetary authorities to the IMF and 
                                                           
18 Most previous research on partial dollarization fails to control for the regulatory environment.  
   12
published in the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  
In general, this classification distinguishes regimes as fixed (single pegs or basket pegs), 
intermediate (limited flexibility, cooperative arrangements, crawling pegs or bands, or 
managed floats following a predetermined set of indicators), and floating (managed 
floats with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate or independent floats).   
However, the regime that countries claim to operate may be different from the regime 
actually followed: many self-described floaters continuously try to minimize exchange 
rate volatility, and some pegged regimes frequently readjust their parity.  To address 
these inconsistencies, I revised and corrected this classification to account for coding 
errors, and I reconciled this de jure information with a new de facto IMF classification 
(available only from 1999 onwards) that distinguishes between managed floats and de 
facto pegs under managed floating. 19  These data are available at an annual frequency.20 
  To assess the robustness of the results to the exchange rate regime classification 
used, I also estimate  (but do not report) the regressions below using the annual regime 
data constructed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS 2000) as an alternative 
classification.  The LYS classification is based on cluster analysis and takes into account 
actual exchange rate volatility, the volatility of exchange rate changes, and the volatility 
of reserves.21  I indicate below whether the results are sensitive to the regime 
classification used. 22 
  Other explanatory variables come from standard sources, such as the 
International Financial Statistics of the IMF and the World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank.  Such variables include inflation, nominal exchange rates, trade openness, 
interest rates, terms of trade, land area, etc., as detailed below.  
                                                           
Savastano (1992, 1996) is a notable exception. 
19 I thank Virgilio Sandoval for kindly providing the new de facto IMF regime data. 
20 To further correct errors with the de jure IMF data and make it as close to actual exchange rate 
behavior as possible, I also reviewed data on frequent and infrequent parity adjusters, first used 
in Ghosh et al. (1997), available until 1996.  I thank Holger Wolf for kindly providing these data. 
21 Note, however, that LYS do not use interest rate data in their analysis, which represents a major 
limitation, as interest rates can be extensively used to fix and defend the exchange rate.  In 
addition, they classify countries as fixers if they exhibit low exchange rate variability but high 
reserve volatility, but they do not account for the presence of capital controls, which may 
minimize the need of using reserves to manage the peg.  Finally, this classification is available for 
significantly fewer observations in my sample. 
22 All unreported results mentioned below are available upon request.   13
 
4 Empirical  Analysis 
 
4.1 Graphical  Analysis 
 
Appendix C displays the dollarization series for a subset of countries in the sample that 
have data on both dollar credit and deposits.23  It can be seen that some countries have 
very low (but not zero) credit dollarization (e.g. Turkmenistan, Sao Tome and Principe) 
or deposit dollarization (e.g. Colombia).24  Some countries have a large share of credit 
denominated in dollars but, since credit is a small part of total assets, a low ratio of 
dollar credit to total bank assets (e.g. Albania).25  In addition, temporary restrictions in 
the use of dollar instruments for financial intermediation (e.g. Peru in 1985-1990) have 
had a major but temporary impact on dollarization.   
  Event-study analysis yields more concrete patterns.  Figure 1 compares the 
average values of the dollarization series around the time of floating rate regime 
adoptions with the average values of the series for countries under fixed or intermediate 
regimes that never adopted flexibility.  The top part uses the series scaled by total 
credit/deposits, while the bottom part uses the series scaled by total assets/liabilities.  
                                                           
23 Each figure in Appendix C consists of two parts.  The top part shows the series scaled by total 
credit and deposits, while the bottom part shows the series scaled by total assets and liabilities.  
Credit dollarization is denoted by circles and deposit dollarization is denoted by a continuous 
line.  All values are percentages.  Figure C1 shows the dollarization patterns for non-floating 
countries (countries under fixed or intermediate regimes for the whole period for which they 
have data for both dollar credit and deposits); Figure C2 shows the series for floating countries; 
and Figure C3 shows the series for countries that experienced both non-floating and floating 
regimes at one point or another in the sample period.  Monthly data are used, and sample 
periods and scales vary by panel. 
24 Those cases may affect the empirical analysis.  For instance, Sao Tome and Principe has a very 
large mismatch and, since it has a floating regime, would impact the result in the direction of 
associating floating with mismatch.  To assess the robustness of the results, I also estimate the 
regressions excluding these unusual cases below.  It turns out that the results are insensitive to 
this issue. 
25 As sensitivity analysis (discussed below), I also estimated the regressions excluding those 
countries and including (when data are available) credit to other sectors in the credit 
dollarization definition for some transition economies where credit to the public sector in dollars 
was a large share of bank total assets (e.g. Turkmenistan).  The results below are robust to these 
cases.   14
The panels show the pattern of deposit and credit dollarization and mismatches two 
years before and after floating regime adoptions (that is, changes from either fixed to 
floating or from intermediate to floating regimes).26  Time is measured in the horizontal 
axis (from –2 to +2 years around regime changes).  In each panel, the vertical line is the 
time of the regime change, and the horizontal line is the average value of the relevant 
dollarization series for the non-floating observations.  The average values of the 
dollarization series during regime changes are surrounded by two-standard-error 
bands.  Annualized data are used.   
  Deposit dollarization significantly increases after the adoption of a flexible 
regime.  Credit dollarization also goes up, but not significantly.  As a result, the deposit-
credit mismatch rises significantly as well.  This is the first evidence that floating 
regimes do not yield greater credit dollarization vis-à-vis deposit dollarization.   
Currency mismatches in financial intermediation seem to go up, not down, in other 
words, during the first years after the adoption of floating regimes.27 
 
4.2  Descriptive Statistics and Comparison of Means 
 
The previous event-study analysis focused on the periods around regime changes.  As it 
is shown below, comparing the means of the relevant variables across regimes during 
“tranquil” periods (periods where no regime changes occurred) yields a similar 
message: floating regimes seem to be associated with greater deposit dollarization and 
larger mismatches.  In order to focus on tranquil periods, I henceforth use a two-sided, 
one-year exclusion window around regime changes that led to the adoption of a floating 
regime.  This exclusion window helps avoid potential regime contamination: 
                                                           
26 I do not consider the case of changes from flexible to non-flexible regimes, as those events were 
rare in my sample period, and because they are not relevant for the purpose of testing the impact 
of floating regimes adoptions on dollarization. 
27 I also use the LYS classification in an analogous event study (not reported).  The patterns 
appear to be different.  Compared to the average value in the non-floating observations, deposit 
dollarization is higher before a regime change, and continues to be higher after such change.  
However, credit dollarization is not significantly different from its non-floating average before or 
after the adoption of a floating regime, nor is the degree of currency mismatch.  Although one 
cannot say that the mismatch increases after the adoption of a LYS floating regime, one can safely 
state that they do not decline, contrary to the implications of the majority view.   15
dollarization may increase before and principally after the collapse of a peg, and such an 
increase may be misleadingly attributed to the subsequent floating regime.   
  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of deposit and credit dollarization and 
currency mismatches across regimes. Clearly, dollarization and mismatches are 
significantly higher under floating than under fixed regimes.  Under flexible regimes, 
credit dollarization is about twice as much as under fixed regimes, while deposit 
dollarization is nearly three times as much.  Mismatches, which are virtually equal to 
zero under fixed regimes, are about 6 per cent of total liabilities under floating regimes. 
These patterns hold regardless of the denominators used to scale dollar credit and 
deposits.28  
  Similar information is conveyed in Table 2.  This table reports a basic version of 
equation (1), in the form of the pooled OLS regression: 
  β ββ ε = ++ + 01 2 it it it it Dollarization Intermediate Floating  (2) 
where Dollarization, Intermediate, and Floating are self-explanatory.  Here, β0 is the mean 
of the relevant dollarization ratio under fixed regimes (the reference group), while 
β β + 01  and β β + 02  are the means under intermediate and flexible regimes, respectively.  
The coefficient of interest is β2.29   
  Both credit and deposit dollarization are significantly higher in floating regimes, 
in both the economic and statistical senses.  When scaling by total credit and deposits, 
credit dollarization is 15 per cent higher under floating regimes than under fixed 
exchange rates (t-statistic: 4.3), and deposit dollarization is 25 per cent higher (t-statistic: 
14.5).  When scaling by total assets and liabilities, the numbers are 7 per cent (t-statistic: 
3.9) and 11 per cent (t-statistic: 12.3), respectively.  As a result, deposit-credit mismatches 
are also higher: while such mismatches are not statistically different from zero under 
                                                           
28 When using the LYS regime data, dollarization and mismatches are also lowest under fixed 
regimes, but they are highest under intermediate rather than under flexible regimes.  However, 
the number of usable observations under LYS floats is much smaller than the number of usable 
observations under IMF floats, due mainly to the exclusion windows used throughout the paper. 
29 For consistency with subsequent regression analysis, I estimate this equation using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.   16
fixed regimes, they are about 6 per cent of total bank liabilities under floating regimes (t-
statistic: 4.5).  This is strong evidence against the implications of the majority view.30 
 
4.3  OLS Analysis: Benchmark Results 
 
So far, the evidence suggests that mismatches in financial intermediation are larger 
under flexible regimes than under fixed regimes.  Does this still hold after controlling for 
other factors affecting dollarization?   
  The answer seems to be “yes.”  I now estimate an extension to equation (2), in the 













  The macroeconomic controls include the following: 
•  Interest rate differential.  One of the determinants of dollarization in the model in 
Appendix A are lending and deposit rate differentials relative to the risk-free 
rate.  I use the difference of the country’s money market rate with respect to the 
rate in the United States as a proxy. 
•  Trade/GDP.  It can be argued that trade dependence encourages dollarization, as 
relatively large export and import sectors may need foreign currency for their 
transactions and may require dollar accounts.  On the other hand, foreign 
exchange earnings of exporters may reduce their need of dollar credit from 
resident banks.  The ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GDP is used to 
control for openness. 
                                                           
30 A slightly different picture emerges when using the LYS regimes.  Unreported results using 
this alternative classification suggest that credit dollarization appears to be no different in fixed 
or flexible regimes.  On the other hand, deposit dollarization as a share of total deposits is about 
12 per cent higher under flexible regimes (t-statistic: 3.7); as a share of total liabilities, it is about 6 
per cent higher (t-statistic: 3.5).  However, currency mismatches do not clearly differ across 
regimes.  Similar results obtain when conducting additional multivariate estimations (analogous 
to those discussed below). 
31 Appendix B presents more detailed information about the controls used.   17
•  Inflation.  Inflation has been a key determinant of dollarization in many countries.  
It is also a good proxy for the macroeconomic mismanagement that may fuel 
dollarization.32 
•  Depreciation.  Large and sudden downward movements of the exchange rate 
have also exacerbated nominal instability and dollarization. In addition, this 
variable serves to control for potential valuation effects. 33 
•  Time trend.  As the movement towards floating regimes has accelerated in the 
past ten years, so has dollarization.  To distinguish the impact of floating regimes 
on dollarization from a common trend, I add a time trend.34 
  The set of historical variables used to control for hysteresis and persistence 
effects includes: 
•  Maximum historical rate of inflation.  High inflation or hyperinflation at one point 
in the past may have led to the acceleration of dollarization in many countries.  
Even if low inflation is achieved later, hysteresis effects may persist (e.g. 
Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru).  Including the highest past rate of inflation 
controls for these effects.   I define the maximum historical rate of inflation as the 
“running” maximum: if in a given year a new maximum is reached, it replaces 
the previous one, until a higher rate of inflation is achieved in a subsequent 
year.35 
•  Maximum historical rate of depreciation.  For the same reasons, including the 
highest past rate of depreciation controls for hysteresis effects.  The definition of 
this variable is similar to that of the maximum historical inflation above. 
                                                           
32 In addition, there is some evidence (Ghosh et al. 1997) suggesting that inflation is higher under 
floating regimes, so its inclusion avoids potential omitted-variable problems. 
33 Valuation effects may be present regardless of the currency used to express the values of the 
variables.  In particular, any dollarization ratio will increase after depreciation by construction.   
If all volumes are expressed in their peso value, the ratio’s numerator will increase, but only one 
part of its denominator (the dollar component) will.  On the other hand, if all volumes are 
expressed in their dollar values, its numerator will stay constant, but its denominator will go 
down (as the dollar value of the denominator’s peso component decreases).  
34 Given collinearity among some controls – particularly inflation and depreciation – I include 
them alternatively in different specifications, as shown below.  However, including them 
together did not change the results for the coefficients of interest.   18
  Finally, the set of regulatory variables affecting dollarization includes the two 
binary indicators mentioned previously: 
•  Foreign currency loans allowed.   This indicator explicitly controls for whether 
dollar credit can be freely issued. 
•  Foreign currency deposits allowed.  Similarly, this indicator explicitly controls for 
whether dollar deposits can be freely issued. 
  Table 3.a reports results scaling the dollarization series by total credit and 
deposits, and Table 3.b reports results scaling the dollarization series by total assets and 
liabilities.  Table 3.c reports estimations for the currency mismatch variable.  In each 
table, I use a variety of specifications to assess the robustness of the results.  More 
specifically, each of Tables 3.a and 3.b reports eight columns, which contain four pairs of 
specifications.  Each pair consists of one regression for credit dollarization and an 
analogous regression for deposit dollarization.  Table 3.c uses the same four 
specifications in the mismatch regressions. 
  Contrary to the implications of the majority view, Tables 3.a and 3.b report some 
evidence that credit dollarization is lower under floating regimes.  The point estimate for 
the floating regime coefficient is always negative, but it is significant only in half of the 
credit dollarization regressions.  On the other hand, there is overwhelming evidence that 
deposit dollarization is significantly higher under floating regimes: Table 3.a suggests 
that the ratio of dollar deposits to total deposits is about 10 to 12 per cent higher, while 
Table 3.b indicates that the ratio of dollar deposits to total liabilities is 6 to 7 per cent 
higher under flexible exchange rates.36  All these coefficients are significant at the 99 per 
cent confidence level.  And the fact that the results reported in Table 3.a are similar to 
those reported in Table 3.b suggests that they are insensitive to scaling.37 
                                                           
35 Note that this definition may result in a time-invariant maximum inflation for many countries, 
as the highest level of inflation usually took place in the 1980s in many cases, while dollarization 
data are usually available from the early 1990s onwards. 
36 The intermediate regime category exhibits qualitatively similar patterns.   
37 Unreported results using the LYS classification suggest that credit dollarization is significantly 
and consistency lower under floating.  Deposit dollarization is higher under floating regimes, but 
the coefficient is not statistically significant in several specifications.  Finally, there is some 
evidence that currency mismatches are higher under LYS floating regimes, but it is not robust.   19
  More importantly, Table 3.c shows that floating regimes are consistently 
associated with greater, not lower, mismatches.  This effect is economically large and 
statistically significant in all regressions: as a share of total bank liabilities, currency 
mismatches are 7 to 8 per cent higher under exchange rate flexibility.  
  The performances of current inflation and depreciation are relatively poor.  Even 
when included separately to ameliorate collinearity problems, the coefficients of 
inflation and depreciation are insignificant in many specifications.  On the other hand, 
maximum inflation and depreciation have a significant explanatory power in both 
deposit and credit dollarization regressions, even more than their contemporaneous 
counterparts, underlining the importance of past events in shaping current dollarization.  
Their coefficients are positive and generally significant: countries that suffered high 
inflation or experienced large depreciation in the past are more prone to have large 
dollarization of both credit and deposits in the present.   
  The time trend confirms the presumption that both deposit and credit 
dollarization have increased over time; on the other hand, it would appear that 
mismatches have declined.  Furthermore, the regulatory indicators have a very large 
explanatory power, confirming the importance of the institutional framework in the 
dollarization process.  The performance of interest rate differentials is poor.  Finally, the 
results for trade openness suggest a negative link with dollarization; perhaps residents 
in relatively closed economies need to rely more on bank-supplied foreign exchange. 
  In sum, the evidence strongly suggests that floating exchange rate regimes do not 
lead to greater credit dollarization, while they result in significantly higher deposit 
dollarization.  As a consequence, currency mismatches are greater under floating 




                                                           
38 I also estimated the regressions with standard errors that are robust to country clustering, thus 
relaxing the assumption of within-country independence.  The results are less well defined, but 
the evidence that deposit dollarization is higher under floating regimes still holds unscathed.   20
4.4 Robustness  Tests 
 
To assess the robustness of these findings, I conducted extensive sensitivity analysis.  To 
save space, I only report the results scaling the dollarization series by total credit and 
deposits, as scaling by total assets and liabilities continues yielding qualitatively 
identical results. 
  Deposit insurance.  The presence of deposit insurance may reduce depositors’ 
incentives to withdraw their funds in periods of banking turmoil, principally if coverage 
includes foreign currency deposits.  Insofar as deposit insurance is part of the existing 
financial safety net, it may also affect banks’ incentives and the pattern of credit 
dollarization.  But the effects of deposit insurance on dollarization and mismatches are 
not clear at priori.  I use a binary annual indicator constructed by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2000) for the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme that covers 
dollar accounts.   Results are reported in the first three columns of Table 4.  It would 
appear that mismatches are lower under the presence of deposit insurance.  However, 
the channel for this effect is not clear: neither credit nor deposit dollarization seems to be 
different under deposit insurance.  In any event, the key result still holds:  currency 
mismatches are larger under floating exchange rates. 
  Forward markets.  The presence of an insurance market against exchange risk may 
influence banks’ behavior regarding mismatches and open currency positions.   
Although data on the volume of hedging activities in insurance markets are not 
available, I constructed an indicator for the existence of a forward exchange market, 
based on information from the country pages of the IMF Annual Reports for the past two 
decades.39  The last three columns of Table 4 show the impact of this binary indicator.  
The relevant results are insensitive to its inclusion: floating regimes are still associated 
with greater deposit dollarization and larger currency mismatches.  In addition, it seems 
as if the presence of a forward market reduces dollarization and mismatches.  Perhaps 
the availability of insurance against currency risk reduces the need for banks and 
                                                           
39 This dummy takes the value of one if a forward market was reported to exist, and zero if such 
market was reported to be underdeveloped, heavily regulated, or nonexistent.   21
depositors to dollarize their assets: they might prefer to hedge their exposures in the 
form of forward contracts instead of in the form of dollar loans and deposits. 
  Managed vs. independent floats.  The IMF floating group includes managed floats 
without a predetermined path for the exchange rate as well as independent floats.  Is 
this aggregation critical?  That is, are the results being driven by one of the components 
of the IMF “float” dummy?  To answer this question, I disaggregate the floating dummy 
into its two subcomponents and include them concurrently.  The results are shown in 
Table 5.  Interestingly, both kinds of floats – managed and independent – are associated 
with larger mismatches.  And column 2 suggests that managed floats increase credit 
dollarization, while independent floats reduce it. 
  Additional sensitivity analysis.  I undertook other robustness tests, estimating 
permutations to the benchmark specifications.  Those permutations included: 
•  Using a two-year exclusion window instead of the one-year window. 
•  Changing the definition of credit dollarization and currency mismatches by 
including bank credit to other sectors of the economy (when such data were 
available). 
•  Dropping outliers and excluding countries with implausibly low or high 
mismatch (e.g. countries where credit dollarization was extremely low while 
deposit dollarization was very large). 
•  Using the IMF regime data but restricting the sample to the observations for 
which LYS regime data are also available, to account for sampling differences 
between the two regime classifications. 
•  Adding regional dummies for the transition economies, South America, and 
Asia. 
•  Using the lagged values of the right-hand-side variables instead of their current 
values. 
•  Using year dummies as time effects instead of the time trend. 
  None of these sensitivity tests significantly changes the main results.  
 
   22
4.5  Panel Data Estimation 
 
The cross-regime OLS analysis above is useful for answering the question:  “How much 
more or less dollarization and mismatches do countries under flexible regimes have, 
compared to those under fixed regimes?”  The fixed effect (“within”) estimator exploits 
the time dimension of the panel data set around country averages and is therefore useful 
to answer a related question: “What is the effect of adopting a floating regime on 
dollarization and mismatches?”  Both questions are very important in terms of policy-
making.  However, the latter is of paramount policy relevance, insofar as the majority 
view advocates that fixed-rate countries should adopt greater exchange rate flexibility.  
In answering this question, I still use one-year exclusion windows around regime 
changes, to avoid regime change contamination.  
  Results with the fixed effect estimator are shown in Table 6.  For comparison, I 
also report random effect estimates.40  As before, the coefficient of the floating regime 
indicator in the credit dollarization regressions is negative but statistically insignificant.  
On the other hand, deposit dollarization is significantly greater after the adoption of 
floating regimes, as the fixed effect estimate shows.  Remarkably, the coefficient of the 
floating regime indicator is almost identical in both the fixed and random effect 
regressions -- 4.5 per cent.   Mismatches are significantly larger under floating regimes: 
as a share of total bank liabilities, they are 12 per cent larger in the fixed effects 
regression and 8 per cent larger in the random effect regression.41 
  There is an important point to be made about these results.  In order to exploit 
the time variation of the data using the within estimator, a sufficient number of switches 
from non-floating to floating regimes are needed.  In my sample, there are 22 switches 
for the credit dollarization regressions, 48 switches for the deposit dollarization 
                                                           
40 Results using the “between” estimator (not reported) suggest similar patterns.  Results using 
the LYS data yield less precise fixed effect estimates, as the number of usable observations with 
LYS regimes is small. 
41 To further account for the persistence of dollarization, I also estimated fixed- and random-effect 
regressions allowing for autocorrelated disturbances.  The results are less precise in both credit 
and deposit dollarization regressions.  Nevertheless, the coefficient of the floating regime 
indicator is positive and significant in the mismatches regressions: the fixed effect coefficient is 11 
per cent and the random effect coefficient is 8 per cent.   23
regressions, and 21 switches for the mismatch regressions.  Ideally, an appropriate 
number of switches would be about 25 or 30 in number, as to make the within estimator 
viable.  Nevertheless, despite the relatively small number of switches, the coefficient of 
the floating regime indicator in the fixed effect mismatch regression is large and 




So far I have assumed that the exchange rate regime is exogenous with respect to 
dollarization.  But the exchange rate regime is a policy decision, based in part on the 
financial characteristics of the economy.  This raises at least the possibility of 
endogeneity. 
  There are reasons to think that endogeneity is not driving the results.  Under 
high dollarization of bank liabilities (e.g. deposit dollarization) and large currency 
mismatches, the monetary authorities may be concerned about the potentially 
destabilizing impact of depreciation shocks.  As a consequence, they may be inclined to 
implement and maintain a fixed exchange rate.  In this context, endogeneity could create 
a bias in favor of floating regimes and lower dollarization and mismatches.   But the 
results above suggest that the opposite is the case. 
  On the other hand, greater dollarization and mismatches may still force countries 
to float (for example, a currency crisis may be partly fueled by mismatches).  However, 
the exclusion windows used throughout this analysis address this problem.  At the same 
time, in a scenario of asset substitution like financial dollarization, the greater sensitivity 
of the exchange rate to portfolio reallocations by residents (which is the domestic 
equivalent to greater capital mobility) may create an additional incentive to adopt a 
more flexible exchange rate.  
  To address these possibilities, I report instrumental variable estimations.  The 
standard optimal currency area literature suggests that if real shocks are prevalent, a 
country may choose exchange rate flexibility.  On the other hand, small economies have 
                                                           
42 In any case, it would be desirable to expand the time span of the data in future research, as to 
have a higher number of switches and be able to obtain more precise fixed effect estimates.   24
an incentive to peg their exchange rate.  Therefore, I use terms-of-trade shocks and land 
area as instruments.  As a third instrument, I use the value of the exchange rate regime 
(for intermediate and floating) in 1974 or, if 1974 regime data are not available, the 
earliest available year.  Given that dollarization in most countries did not begin until 
after the early 1980s, the 1974 value of the regime should be regarded as plausibly 
exogenous or at least predetermined.   
  The results, reported in Table 7, suggest that endogeneity does not drive the 
results.  I report IV estimates along with their OLS counterparts for comparison.  Deposit 
dollarization is still overwhelmingly and significantly higher under flexible exchange 
rate regimes.  Note that the estimated coefficients of floating regimes in the deposit 
dollarization regressions are larger when they are estimated by instrumental variables: 
while the OLS estimate is 10 per cent, the IV estimate is 37 per cent.  (Both of them are 
significant at the 99 per cent confidence level).  This is evidence that the potential bias 
worked against the OLS results reported previously.  On the other hand, the estimated 
impact of the floating regimes on credit dollarization is negative but insignificant 
regardless of estimation method.  More importantly, the mismatch ratio is still greater 
under floating regimes after controlling for endogeneity; however, the point estimate of 
the floating regime indicator is statistically insignificant due to larger standard errors.43  
However, while the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity in the credit 
and deposit dollarization regressions, it fails to reject exogeneity in the mismatch 
regression (with a P-value of 0.3). 
  I calculated these results using 2SLS.  The endogenous right-hand-side variables 
(the intermediate and floating regime indicators) are not continuous, though.  In the first 
stage, some fitted values of the intermediate and floating dummies may lie beyond the 
[0,1] interval.  In order to account for the dichotomous nature of the regime indicators, I 
proceed as follows.  First, I estimate an ordered probit equation using the three regimes 
as one polychotomous dependent variable and the instrumental variables mentioned 
above as regressors.  Then, I use the fitted probabilities of the intermediate and floating 
                                                           
43 I also estimated the regressions using political variables (such as the average number of 
revolutions and the average number of political crises during the sample period, using data from 
the Arthur S. Banks Cross National Time Series Data Archive) as additional instruments.  The 
unreported results are qualitatively the same.   25
regimes from this probit regression as instruments in a 2SLS estimation.  The results 
using this procedure are reported in Table 8 and are fairly similar to those reported in 
the preceding table.   Credit dollarization is negatively but insignificantly linked with 
floating regimes, while deposit dollarization is significantly higher under flexibility, 
regardless of estimation method.  Remarkably, the floating regime coefficient in the 
mismatch IV regression (14 per cent) is larger than its OLS counterpart (8 per cent) and it 
is statistically significant (at the 90 per cent confidence level).  Again, the evidence 
suggests that any bias was working against the OLS results above.  A Hausman test 
again fails to reject the null of exogeneity in the currency mismatch regression (with a P-
value of 0.38).   
  In conclusion, IV estimates show that the results are not driven by potential 
endogeneity of the regime.44  In particular, it is fair to say that the OLS evidence reported 
earlier on a positive coefficient of floating regimes on the mismatch regressions is robust 
to endogeneity, as the IV estimations yield less efficient but still positive coefficients 
while formal tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
 
5  Discussion and Caveats 
 
Summing up, all the evidence presented in this paper yields the same message: floating 
regimes encourage deposit dollarization more strongly than they encourage matching 
via credit dollarization; as a result, they exacerbate currency mismatches in financial 
intermediation.  The question is: Why does this robust stylized fact obtain? 
  The theoretical framework outlined above suggests that default risk may play an 
important role in shaping these results.  However, empirical scrutiny on the role of 
default risk requires gathering data on the share of non-performing dollar loans in a 
large number of countries and analyzing the links between exchange rate flexibility and 
dollar loan default rates.  This is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future 
research. 
                                                           
44 Analogous unreported estimations fixing the sample to a common number of observations for 
each IV-OLS pair of regressions yield similar results.   26
  More generally, it is of paramount importance to study more closely the 
determinants of banks’ supply of dollar loans in the context of risk management.  Credit 
dollarization leads to diversification and redistribution of exchange risk that could in 
principle be stabilizing.  The results in this paper suggest that banks in developing 
countries are not willing to transfer such a risk to firms – or, at least, they are not any 
more willing to do so under flexible exchange rates.  If that is the case, we need to 
understand this issue better.45 
  That said, it is also important to keep a number of caveats in mind.  A first 
caveat, already mentioned earlier in the paper, is that deposit-credit mismatches do not 
account for all the foreign currency exposure of banks.  A bank facing a deposit-credit 
mismatch may hedge by purchasing dollar-denominated securities.  It may also conduct 
off-balance sheet transactions and buy insurance in forward markets.  Regrettably, the 
necessary data to analyze this issue more closely are non-existent for a large number of 
countries. 
  A second caveat, also mentioned previously, relates to domestic- and foreign-
currency lending and deposit interest rates, as well as the corresponding spreads.  These 
interest rates may be adjusted in order to help compensate existing mismatches and 
reduce overall risk.  But again, lack of data is a major limitation to further study this 
matter. 
  A third caveat is the presence of foreign banks in several dollarized economies.  
A foreign bank may choose to leave some liabilities unhedged in country A but may 
hold excess dollar assets in country B.  If so, it may be perfectly hedged, even though 
data in country A give the impression that it is not.  Pursuing this issue further would 
require reliable micro-level data on the currency denomination and location of assets 
and liabilities of foreign banks, which are not readily available. 
  Finally, a fourth caveat is whether there can be an “optimal” degree of mismatch 
in financial intermediation.  It is not clear whether a perfectly matched banking system 
                                                           
45 This analysis has largely ignored dollar credit demand by firms and dollar deposit demand by 
banks.  In particular, it has assumed that changes in dollar volumes are mainly supply-driven.  
While the focus of this paper on equilibrium volumes of loans and deposits minimizes this 
limitation, further research is clearly desirable to identify the effects of exchange rate flexibility on 
both supply and demand of dollar credits and deposits.   27
exhibits lower overall risk than a slightly mismatched one, given the trade-off between 
currency risk and default risk.  And the slightly mismatched banking system may 
compensate its greater deposit-credit mismatch by holding more dollar securities.  (Of 
course, whether it is socially optimal that banks hold a greater proportion of their dollar 
assets in the form of securities in international markets, rather than in the form of credit 
to finance productive domestic investment, represents an additional welfare issue to 
consider).  Both theoretical and empirical research on that direction is needed. 
 
6 Concluding  Remarks 
 
The currency and financial crises of the 1990s reignited the debate on the impact of 
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  r e g i m e s .   O n e  a s p e c t  o f  t h at debate concerns the links between the 
exchange rate regime and currency mismatches.  The majority view on the issue has it 
that greater flexibility encourages banks and firms to limit their foreign currency 
exposure.  This view is appealing and generally accepted by many.  Nevertheless, it has 
never been tested systematically.   
  This paper is a first attempt to test it.  I study whether flexible exchange rate 
regimes are associated with lower currency mismatches in financial intermediation.  To 
that end, I assemble a comprehensive database on the dollarization of bank deposits and 
credit in a large number of developing and transition economies, along with 
accompanying bank regulatory arrangements. 
  The results do not support the presumption that flexibility is associated with a 
reduction of currency mismatches in the banking systems of financially dollarized 
countries.  Most (if not all) of the evidence goes against such presumption.  Floating 
exchange rate regimes result in higher deposit dollarization vis-à-vis credit dollarization.  
Therefore, currency mismatches in financial intermediation are more severe under 
exchange rate flexibility.  These results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of 
controls, different definitions of dollarization and mismatches, the presence of outliers, 
different specifications, different estimation methods, and the potential presence of 
endogeneity.     28
  If these results are right, and insofar as currency mismatches in financial 
intermediation are an important component of banks’ overall foreign currency 
exposures, they constitute the first systematic evidence that flexible exchange rate 
regimes may exacerbate such exposures in developing countries.  This is an important 
implication, deserving serious attention.  If this is indeed the case, policymakers in 
dollarized economies, as well as academics and multilateral organizations, might wish 
to reassess the desirability of greater exchange rate flexibility and its impact on open 
foreign currency positions.  Of course, further research is needed to conclude whether 
these results apply to overall currency mismatches in banks’ (and firms’) balance sheets, 
as well as to hedged and unhedged exposures in insurance markets.  Until that research 
is done, however, the burden of proof is in the majority view’s side.  Perhaps it is time to 
look at the minority view more seriously. 
   29
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7 Appendices 
 
A  A Simple Model of Two-Currency Banking under Exchange 




1.  Lending and deposit rates are contracted ex ante or at least do not fully reflect 
exchange rate depreciation shocks, so that ex post returns may be affected by 
such shocks. 
2.  Agents are risk averse. 
3.  Banking is perfectly competitive, so that all rates of return are given.  
4.  Optimal levels of credit are supply-determined by banks.  (Firms have a passive 
role in loan dollarization.) 
5.  Optimal levels of deposits are supply-determined by depositors.  (Banks have a 
passive role in deposit dollarization.) 
 
A.2  Loan Dollarization: Basic Setup 
 
Consider a representative bank making decisions over a one-period horizon.46  The bank 
has to decide, as a portfolio manager, how to allocate its available funds,  L W , in 
domestic currency (“peso”) denominated loans  1 L  and foreign currency (“dollar”) 
denominated loans  2 L .  The random real returns of peso and dollar loans are   1 L r  and   2 L r , 
respectively.47  The bank invests the rest of its available wealth in a riskless asset with 
deterministic return  0 L r .  All volumes are expressed in their dollar values. 
  The real rates of return, in dollar terms, of peso and dollar loans are defined as 
                                                           
46 This framework is related to that of Freixas and Rochet (1997), chapter 8.  Maturity mismatch 
issues are purposely excluded. 













   (A.1) 
where  1 L c  and  2 L c  are the non-random components of their respective real rates of 
returns,   e  is a random depreciation shock, and θ  is a random dollar loan non-
performance probability shock.48  These variables are assumed to have finite means 
(which could be zero) and variances, and positive covariance.  
  The dollar value of the random profits of the bank is 
  π =− − + +   01 2 1 1 2 2 () LL L L rW L L r L r L  
which can be re-written in terms of excess returns as 
  π =+ −+ −   01 0 1 2 0 2 () () LL L L L L rW r r L r r L (A.2) 
  The objective function that the risk-averse bank seeks to maximize is 
  π π π πµ σ =≡ 
2
12 ( , )( ( ) , v a r ( ) )( , ) LL L FLL UE U  (A.3) 
where  L U is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with  π µ ∂∂ > 0 L U  and 
π σ ∂∂ <
2 0 L U .49 
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48 Alternatively, θ can also be interpreted as a shock to the share of non-performance dollar loans.  
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that non-performing dollar loans pay nothing to the 
bank. For simplicity, non-performing peso loans are not introduced.   34
and, thus, the optimal values of  1 L  and  2 L  can be written as 
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where 
π π µ σ λ
∂∂
∂ ∂ =− > 2 2 0
LL
L
UU is a constant, ∆ =− >   
2
12 1 2 var( )var( ) cov( , ) 0 LL L L L rr r r  is the 
determinant of the (positive definite) variance-covariance matrix, and  Li r  is the expected 
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both of which are positive values provided that  − >−   21 0 1 22 0 var( )( ) cov( , )( ) LL L L LL L rrr r rrr  
and  −> −   12 0 1 21 0 var( )( ) cov( , )( ) LL L L LL L rrr r rrr .  These conditions are henceforth assumed to 
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A.3  Effect of Volatility on Dollar Lending 
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49 Consistent with the experience of dollarized economies, the bank maximizes the value of its 
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  Higher volatility of depreciation and default negatively affects optimal loan 
issues, as equations (A.11) and (A.14) show.  Intuitively, such greater variance renders 
the ex post return of the risky assets more volatile, which makes them less attractive 
given risk aversion.  In addition, the cross-effects in equations (A.12) and (A.13) suggest 
a positive (substitution) effect based on expected excess returns, and a negative, 
offsetting effect based on risk.  The intuition is simple: depreciation (dollar loan default) 
shocks increase the relative ex post return of dollar (peso) assets, but the volatility of 
such shocks increases uncertainty, which the risk-averse bank dislikes.  Furthermore, the 
higher the level of loan issues, the stronger the negative risk effect.  
 Let  θ  be now a function of   e , so that 








e  and  ξ  is a zero-mean random shock orthogonal to   e .   
  With endogenous dollar loan default, the effects of changes in exchange rate 
volatility are different from those in equations (A.11) and (A.12).  Using a first-order 
Taylor expansion to obtain expressions for the variance of θ  () e  and the covariance term, 
it can be shown that 
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  Once dollar loan default becomes endogenous, there are additional effects of 
exchange rate volatility on both peso and dollar loans.  In general, the negative, 
offsetting effect of volatility on dollar lending is now unambiguously stronger than in   36
the exogenous loan default case.  The exact extent of this additional negative effect 
depends upon the elasticity of dollar loan default to the rate of depreciation.  
 
A.4  Deposit Dollarization: Basic Setup 
 
Consider a representative depositor deciding how to allocate her available wealth,  D W , 
between peso and dollar deposits,  1 D  and  2 D , with rates of return   1 D r  and   2 D r .  The 
depositor invests the rest of her available wealth in a riskless asset with deterministic 
rate of return  0 D r .50  Again, all rates of return are given, and all volumes are expressed in 
their dollar values. 
  There are two sources of uncertainty:  depreciation risk and deposit loss risk.  
Depreciation risk affects the real return (in dollar terms) on peso deposits.  Deposit loss 
risk, based on the potential inability of the bank to repay deposits in the presence of 
insolvency problems (which are themselves a function of dollar loan default), affects the 
return of both peso and dollar deposits.  However, that risk may differ between 
deposits.  In particular, it may be greater for dollar deposits, because they are also 
subject to convertibility (even confiscation) risk.  I normalize peso deposit loss risk to 
zero, and only consider the dollar-to-peso deposit loss risk differential.  Therefore, the 














  Equation (A.18) has the same interpretation as equation (A.1).  The only 









  The total return in dollar terms of the depositor’s portfolio can be written as 
  i =+ −+ −  01 0 1 2 0 2 () () DD D D D D Rr W r rD r rD  (A.19) 
and the depositor’s objective function is 
  i i µ σ =≡
2
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where  µ ∂∂ > 0 DR U and  σ ∂∂ <
2 0 DR U .   37
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A.5  Effect of Volatility on Dollar Deposits 
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  With endogenous dollar loan default, the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
peso and dollar deposits is 
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50 This riskless asset could be understood as cross-border dollar deposits (assuming that banks 
abroad do not face solvency or confiscation issues).   38
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  Greater exchange rate volatility reduces peso deposits and may increase dollar 
d e p o s i t s .   H o w e v e r ,  w i t h  e n d o g e n o u s  l o a n  default, the potential increase of dollar 
deposits due to greater exchange rate volatility is unambiguously lower.  The precise 
extent of this additional negative effect depends upon the elasticity of perceived dollar 
deposit loss risk to bank solvency problems, as well as the elasticity of dollar loan 
default to depreciation.  
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B Data  Appendix 
 
B.1  Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Abbreviations:  AREAER:  IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions  country pages  (various issues).  CB: Central Bank bulletins (various 
countries/issues).  IFS: IMF International Financial Statistics.  MBS: IMF Money and 





•  Total credit to the resident private sector issued by resident banks.  Source: line 
22d of IFS. 
•  Foreign-currency-denominated (“dollar”) credit to the resident private sector 
issued by resident banks.  Sources: CB and MBS. 
•  Total assets of resident banks.  Sources: CB and MBS. 
•  Total deposits of residents held in resident banks.  Source: lines 24 plus line 25 of 
IFS. 
•  Foreign-currency-denominated (“dollar”) deposits of residents held in resident  
banks.  Sources: CB, MBS, and lines 25.a and 25b of IFS. 
•  Total liabilities of resident banks.  Sources: CB and MBS. 
 
Definition of Dependent Variables   
•  Credit dollarization (percent).  First definition: ratio of dollar credit to total 
credit.  Second definition: ratio of dollar credit to total assets. 
•  Deposit dollarization (percent).  First definition: ratio of dollar deposits to total 
deposits.  Second definition: ratio of dollar deposits to total liabilities. 
•  Currency mismatches (percent): Ratio of gap between dollar deposits and dollar 
credit to total liabilities [i.e. (dollar deposits – dollar credit) * 100 / (total 
liabilities)].   40
 
Exchange Rate Regime Data 
 
Default classification: IMF regimes.  Source: AREAER.  (Revised and corrected using 
information provided by Virgilio Sandoval and Holger Wolf, via personal 
correspondence.) 
 
•  Fixed regimes: binary for fixed exchange rate regimes against a particular 
currency, a basket of currencies, or SDR. 
•  Intermediate regimes: binary for limited flexibility or managed floats with a pre-
announced path for the exchange rate. 
•  Floating regimes: binary for managed floats with no pre-announced path for the 
exchange rate or independent floats. 
 
Alternative classification (for sensitivity analysis): LYS regimes.  Source: Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2000).  See their paper for definitions of fixed, intermediate, and 





•  Foreign currency loans allowed: binary for whether or not dollar loans are freely 
or almost freely allowed.  Source: AREAER, other IMF publications. 
•  Foreign currency deposits allowed: binary for whether or not dollar deposits are 




•  Interest rate differentials (percentage points): difference of line 60b of IFS with 
that of the United States.  If line 60b is unavailable, line 60c is used.  If line 60c is 
unavailable, line 60 is used.  Source: IFS   41
•  Trade (percent): ratio of exports plus imports to GDP.  Source: WDI. 
•  Inflation (percent): percentage change of CPI, as reported by source.  If series is 
unavailable, percentage change of GDP deflator, as reported by source.  Source: 
WDI. 
•  Depreciation (percent): first difference of the log of the nominal exchange rate * 
100.  Source: WDI.   
•  Maximum historical inflation: running maximum value of inflation rate (as 
defined above). 
•  Maximum historical depreciation: running maximum value of depreciation rate 
(as defined above). 
•  Forward market indicator: binary for whether a forward market was reported to 
exist, as opposed to being reported to be underdeveloped, heavily regulated, or 
nonexistent.  Source: AREAER. 
•  Deposit insurance: binary for whether there is an explicit deposit insurance 





•  Terms-of-trade shocks (percent): first difference of the log of terms-of-trade index 
in goods and services * 100.  Source: WDI. 
•  Land area in squared kilometers.  Source: WDI. 
•  Initial exchange rate regime: IMF regime in 1974 or earliest year available.   
Source: AREAER. 
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B.2  Country Coverage and Dollarization Data Availability 
Country  Deposits Credit  Country  Deposits Credit  Country  Deposits Credit 
Albania  1994-99 1994-99  Haiti  1997-99 1997-99  Qatar  1993-99 -- 
Angola  1995-99 --  Hong  Kong,  China  1990-99 --  Romania  1990-99 -- 
Antigua and Barbuda  1979-99  --  Hungary  1989-99  1989-99  Russian Federation  1993-99  1993-99 
Argentina  1994-99 1994-99  Indonesia  1992-99 1992-99  Rwanda  1994-99 -- 
Armenia  1994-99  1994-99  Israel  1981-99  1975-99  Sao Tome and Principe  1995-99  1995-99 
Bahamas,  The  1975-99 1977-99  Jordan  1993-99 --  Saudi  Arabia  1975-99 1992-99 
Bahrain  1984-99 --  Kenya  1995-99 --  Sierra  Leone  1996-99 -- 
Bangladesh  1987-99  --  Korea, Rep.  --  1975-99  Slovak Republic  1993-99  -- 
Barbados  1975-99 --  Kuwait  1981-99   Slovenia  1991-99 -- 
Belarus  1998-99 1996-99  Kyrgyz  Republic 1995-99 1995-96  South  Africa  --  1992-99 
Belize  1976-99  --  Lao PDR  1987-99  1987-99  St. Kitts and Nevis  1979-99  -- 
Bhutan  1993-99 --  Latvia  1993-99 --  St.  Lucia  1979-99 -- 
Bolivia  1975-99  1996-99  Lithuania  1993-99  1993-99  St. Vincent & Grenadines  1979-99  -- 
Bulgaria  1995-99 --  Malawi  1996-99 --  Sudan  1992-99 -- 
Cambodia  1993-99 1993-99  Malaysia  1996-99 1996-99  Suriname  1975-76 -- 
Cape Verde  1995-99  --  Maldives  1981-99  1985-99  Syrian Arab Republic  1975-99  -- 
Chile  1976-99 1976-99  Malta  1975-84 --  Tanzania  1993-99 -- 
Colombia  1990-99 1990-99  Mauritius  1992-99 --  Thailand  1982-99 -- 
Comoros  1998-99 --  Mexico  1997-99 1997-99  Tonga  1994-99 -- 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1975-99  --  Moldova  1998-99  1998-99  Trinidad and Tobago  1996-99  -- 
Costa  Rica  1997-99 1997-99  Mongolia  1993-99 1994-99  Turkey  1986-99 -- 
Cyprus  1991-99 --  Mozambique  1991-99 --  Turkmenistan  1998-99 1998-99 
Czech  Republic  1993-99 1997-99  Myanmar  1991-99 --  Uganda  1993-99 -- 
Dominica  1988-99 --  Netherlands  Antilles  1975-99 --  Ukraine  1992-99 1998-99 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1980-99  1980-99  Nicaragua  1996-99  1996-99  United Arab Emirates  1981-99  -- 
El  Salvador  1982-99 --  Nigeria  1992-99 --  Uruguay  1998-99 1998-99 
Estonia  1991-99 1991-99  Oman  1975-99 --  Vanuatu  1981-99 -- 
Ethiopia  1998-99  --  Papua New Guinea  1976-81, 87-99  1979-99  Venezuela  1996-99  1996-99 
Georgia  1995-99 1995-99  Paraguay  1988-99 1988-99  Vietnam  1992-99 1992-99 
Grenada  1979-99 --  Peru  1975-99 1975-99  Yemen,  Rep.  1990-99 -- 
Guatemala  1997-99 1997-99  Philippines  1982-99 --  Zambia  1998-99 -- 
Guinea  1989-99 --  Poland  1991-99 1996-99  Zimbabwe  1993-99 -- 
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C  Graphical Appendix for Selected Countries 
 
Figure C.1: Financial Dollarization, Non-Floaters 
 
Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Non-Floaters - 1 of 2
Dollar Credit/Total Credit and Dollar Deposits/Total Deposits
Argentina





































Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Non-Floaters - 1 of 2
Dollar Credit/Total Assets and Dollar Deposits/Total Liabilities
Argentina
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Figure C.1 (Concluded) 
 
Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Non-Floaters - 2 of 2
Dollar Credit/Total Credit and Dollar Deposits/Total Deposits
Nicaragua




































Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Non-Floaters - 2 of 2
Dollar Credit/Total Assets and Dollar Deposits/Total Liabilities
Nicaragua
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Figure C.2: Financial Dollarization, Floaters 
 
Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Floaters - 1 of 2
Dollar Credit/Total Credit and Dollar Deposits/Total Deposits
Albania













































Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Floaters - 1 of 2
Dollar Credit/Total Assets and Dollar Deposits/Total Liabilities
Albania
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Figure C.2 (Concluded) 
 
Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Floaters - 2 of 2




































Sao Tome and Principe









Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Floaters - 2 of 2
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Figure C.3: Financial Dollarization, Countries Under Several Regimes 
 
Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Various Regimes - 1 of 2

















































Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Various Regimes - 1 of 2
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Figure C.3 (Concluded) 
 
Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Various Regimes - 2 of 2
Dollar Credit/Total Credit and Dollar Deposits/Total Deposits
Lithuania













































Credit denoted by 'o'.  Deposits denoted by continuous line
Monthly Data, 1975m1-2000m6. Sample Period and Scales Vary by Panel
Dollarization (%):  Credit vs. Deposits - Various Regimes - 2 of 2
Dollar Credit/Total Assets and Dollar Deposits/Total Liabilities
Lithuania
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8  Figure and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Effect of Floating Regime Adoption 
 
Floating Regime Onset; Non-Floating Mean Marked.
Data Vary by Panel.
Movements 2 Years Before & After Floating Regime Adoption
























Floating Regime Onset; Non-Floating Mean Marked.
Data Vary by Panel.
Movements 2 Years Before & After Floating Regime Adoption































   50
 
Note: In all tables below, a two-sided, one-year exclusion window around floating regime 
adoptions is used. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Dollarization Ratios Across Regimes 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










All        
     Countries  40  92  39  88  37 
     Observations  358  1018  352  929  314 
     Mean  27.23  21.64  10.95  10.38  2.83 
     Std. Deviation  23.32  22.10  11.88  11.43  9.42 
Fixed Regimes           
     Observations  108  515  108  498  98 
     Mean  21.86  12.83  7.77  6.49  0.27 
     Std. Deviation  18.45  17.99  9.05  10.00  8.44 
Intermediate 
Regimes 
       
     Observations  123  185  123  160  106 
     Mean  24.47  25.77  11.32  13.81  2.17 
     Std. Deviation  20.73  19.86  12.26  12.10  9.66 
Floating Regimes           
     Observations  97  226  91  193  82 
     Mean  36.56  37.01  14.15  17.01  6.17 







OLS Regressions on Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 












































Observations 300  868  294  797  259 
Adjusted R2 0.08  0.23  0.05  0.16  0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.a 
OLS Regressions on Regimes and Controls: Credit and Deposit Dollarization (I) 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
















-13.383*** 7.261***  -14.837*** 7.244***  -9.564***  7.659*** -10.583***  4.301**  Intermediate 
Regime  (2.794) (2.216)  (2.783) (2.216)  (2.411) (1.994)  (2.536) (1.926) 
-5.154 12.720***  -7.842**  12.334***  -6.775** 11.225*** -5.466*  10.293***  Floating 
Regime  (3.588) (2.116)  (3.710) (2.085)  (3.000) (1.876)  (3.256) (1.696) 
-0.140*** 0.013  -0.145*** 0.013  -0.061* 0.032*  -0.049  0.065***  Trade/GDP 
(0.033) (0.020)  (0.033) (0.020)  (0.032) (0.019)  (0.034) (0.018) 
0.050 0.001*      0.027 -0.003***      Inflation 
(0.051)  (0.000)     (0.067)  (0.001)    
-0.007 0.062*** -0.013 0.063*** 0.015 0.051***  -0.028  0.061***  Interest 
Differentials  (0.042) (0.013)  (0.020) (0.018)  (0.054) (0.010)  (0.022) (0.016) 
18.190***   18.778***   15.596***   16.972***   FC Loans 
Allowed  (2.010)   (2.078)   (1.908)   (2.027)  
 14.997***   14.936***   13.537***   12.479***  FC Deposits 
Allowed   (1.401)   (1.365)   (1.358)   (1.217) 
   0.175***  0.023     0.179***  -0.058***  Depreciation 
   (0.065)  (0.019)     (0.066)  (0.018) 
         0.087***  0.102***  Depreciation 
Maximum           (0.015)  (0.007) 
      0.006***  0.004***     Inflation 
Maximum        (0.001)  (0.001)    
1.255*** 0.480***  1.290*** 0.445***  0.903*** 0.391***  0.701*** 0.186**  Time Trend 
(0.201) (0.106)  (0.197) (0.103)  (0.171) (0.097)  (0.195) (0.090) 
1.497 -6.506**  1.200 -6.125**  -0.224 -6.758***  -3.398 -9.445***  Constant 
(3.846) (2.645)  (3.760) (2.622)  (3.859) (2.528)  (3.915) (2.396) 
Observations  215 574  212 587  215 574  212 587 
Adjusted R2 0.34  0.37  0.35  0.37  0.54 0.48  0.52 0.51 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.b 
OLS Regressions on Regimes and Controls: Credit and Deposit Dollarization (II) 
 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) 
















-4.873*** 4.005***  -4.969*** 4.094***  -2.112** 4.257***  -2.264*  2.767***  Intermediate 
Regime (1.431)  (1.146)  (1.417)  (1.143) (1.068)  (1.057) (1.310)  (1.045) 
-2.492 6.513*** -2.668 6.265*** -3.341** 6.229***  -1.157  5.540***  Floating 
Regime  (1.896) (1.096)  (1.945) (1.071)  (1.429) (1.020)  (1.573) (0.910) 
-0.078*** -0.013*  -0.077*** -0.011 -0.020  -0.006 -0.017  0.012*  Trade/GDP 
(0.019) (0.007)  (0.019) (0.007)  (0.015) (0.007)  (0.016) (0.006) 
-0.022  0.000***     -0.030  -0.001*     Inflation 
(0.018)  (0.000)     (0.030)  (0.001)    
0.018 0.025***  -0.005  0.018***  0.026 0.013  -0.015  0.016***  Interest 
Differentials  (0.015) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.006)  (0.024) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.005) 
7.723***   8.091***   6.100***   6.942***    FC Loans 
Allowed  (1.000)   (1.035)   (0.855)   (0.999)   
 7.435***   7.304***   6.861***   6.165***  FC Deposits 
Allowed    (0.753)   (0.734)   (0.736)   (0.671) 
   0.017  0.017*     0.020  -0.021*  Depreciation 
   (0.029)  (0.010)     (0.026)  (0.011) 
         0.056***  0.047***  Depreciation 
Maximum           (0.010)  (0.005) 
      0.004***  0.002***      Inflation 
Maximum        (0.000)  (0.001)     
0.672*** 0.209***  0.689*** 0.188***  0.426*** 0.176***  0.314*** 0.073*  Time Trend 
(0.115) (0.050)  (0.115) (0.049)  (0.080) (0.046)  (0.095) (0.042) 
-0.023  -0.840 -0.858  -0.740 -1.733 -0.908  -3.781*  -2.288**  Constant 
(1.935) (1.076)  (1.977) (1.066)  (1.847) (1.022)  (2.006) (0.945) 
Observations  212  556 212  571 212  556 212  571 
Adjusted R2 0.28  0.37  0.28  0.36  0.64 0.44  0.52 0.47 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.c 
OLS Regressions on Regimes and Controls: Currency Mismatches 
 









3.564* 3.274* 0.560  3.222*  Intermediate 
Regime  (1.830) (1.815) (1.601) (1.897) 
8.148*** 7.161*** 6.510*** 7.145***  Floating 
Regime  (1.700) (1.707) (1.542) (1.729) 
0.009 0.007 -0.021  0.005  Trade/GDP 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
0.029   0.032   Inflation 
(0.027)   (0.030)  
-0.014 -0.011 -0.016 -0.011  Interest 
Differentials  (0.021) (0.012) (0.024) (0.012) 
-3.194* -3.479* -2.829* -3.450*  FC Loans 
Allowed  (1.723) (1.826) (1.672) (1.857) 
3.476 4.105*  3.635 4.111*  FC Deposits 
Allowed  (2.299) (2.351) (2.273) (2.369) 
 0.081*   0.080*  Depreciation 
 (0.045)   (0.045) 
  -0.001***    Inflation 
Maximum    (0.000)   
   -0.001  Depreciation 
Maximum     (0.007) 
-0.404*** -0.417***   -0.408***  Time Trend 
(0.114) (0.121)   (0.125) 
5.711* 5.722* 2.317  5.793*  Constant 
(3.163) (3.185) (2.607) (3.232) 
Observations  177 177 177 177 
Adjusted R2  0.12 0.13 0.16 0.13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4 
OLS Regressions with Deposit Insurance and Forward Market Indicators 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












-8.160*** 2.800  2.879  -9.306*** 3.278  3.822*  Intermediate 
Regime (2.396)  (1.960)  (1.816) (2.902) (2.158) (2.044) 
-1.465 7.894***  5.212***  -4.404 9.209***  6.831***  Floating 
Regime  (3.069) (1.775) (1.682) (3.271) (1.740) (1.757) 
-0.034 0.077***  -0.015 -0.035 0.061***  0.022  Trade/GDP 
(0.036) (0.019) (0.017) (0.042) (0.019) (0.018) 
0.057 -0.002***  0.013 0.055 -0.002***  0.035  Inflation 
(0.080) (0.001) (0.024) (0.084) (0.001) (0.026) 
0.082*** 0.100*** 0.004  0.088*** 0.098*** -0.001  Depreciation 
Maximum  (0.018) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) 
-0.025 0.037***  -0.000 -0.027 0.037***  -0.026  Interest 
Differentials (0.065)  (0.011)  (0.019) (0.070) (0.010) (0.020) 
14.576***   -1.849  17.442***   -0.941  FC Loans  
Allowed  (2.091)   (1.748) (2.790)   (1.710) 
  14.027*** 6.750***    13.183*** 3.450  FC Deposits  
Allowed    (1.357) (2.191)   (1.374) (2.247) 
0.581*** 0.191*  -0.293***  0.763*** 0.183*  -0.323**  Time Trend 
(0.184) (0.098) (0.108) (0.212) (0.101) (0.148) 
5.650 -0.950  -6.296***        Deposit Insurance 
(4.546) (1.766) (2.176)      
   -2.526  -0.648  -5.963***  Forward 
Market       (3.211)  (1.489)  (1.714) 
-1.866 -10.185***  3.165  -4.197 -8.699***  6.005*  Constant 
(4.614) (2.390) (2.838) (4.921) (2.564) (3.353) 
Observations  206 506 171 200 548 165 
Adjusted R2  0.51 0.51 0.17 0.50 0.51 0.20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5 
OLS Regressions Disaggregating IMF Floating Regime 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dollar Credit/  
Total Credit 










1.019 -8.591***  12.325***  3.900** 2.227  3.389*  Intermediate 
Regime (2.662)  (2.499)  (1.671) (1.960) (1.359) (1.976) 
27.621*** 10.163**  28.464*** 14.976*** 5.438***  7.431***  Managed Floating 
(5.543) (4.773) (2.843) (2.572) (1.808) (2.379) 
8.798** -6.555**  22.756***  7.104*** 6.638*** 8.487***  Independent 
Floating  (3.670) (3.302) (1.930) (1.836) (1.616) (1.825) 
 -0.022   0.066***   0.001  Trade/GDP 
 (0.035)   (0.018)   (0.017) 
 0.026   -0.002***   0.029  Inflation 
 (0.071)   (0.001)   (0.027) 
 0.099***   0.102***   -0.004  Depreciation 
Maximum   (0.015)    (0.007)    (0.008) 
 -0.002   0.035***   -0.015  Interest 
Differentials   (0.058)    (0.010)    (0.022) 
 15.245***     -3.080  FC Loans  
Allowed   (2.260)     (1.886) 
   12.393***   3.622  FC Deposits  
Allowed     (1.225)   (2.507) 
 0.577***   0.206**   -0.374***  Time Trend 
 (0.191)   (0.090)   (0.120) 
21.791*** -3.244  12.297*** -9.921*** -0.086  6.022*  Constant 
(1.924) (4.493) (0.814) (2.451) (0.957) (3.254) 
Observations  301 210 867 570 260 175 
Adjusted R2  0.12 0.54 0.23 0.52 0.06 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












  Fixed Effects  Random Effects  Fixed Effects  Random Effects  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
0.039 -0.017  -4.642***  -4.140*** -0.102  -0.310  Intermediate 
Regime (2.736)  (2.537)  (1.363) (1.347) (1.631) (1.519) 
-5.394 -1.232 4.523**  4.527*** 11.712***  8.174***  Floating 
Regime (5.126)  (3.547)  (1.760) (1.639) (3.011) (1.986) 
0.086 0.034 0.005 0.020 -0.041  -0.009  Trade/GDP 
(0.062) (0.046) (0.020) (0.018) (0.034) (0.025) 
0.009 -0.003  -0.001***  -0.001*** 0.041**  0.051***  Inflation 
(0.039) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.019) 
0.033 0.098***  0.125***  0.121*** 0.072*  0.005  Depreciation 
Maximum (0.067)  (0.018)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.039) (0.010) 
0.035 0.032 0.026***  0.027*** -0.034*  -0.032*  Interest 
Differentials  (0.032) (0.031) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) 
52.567** 24.239***      -26.550* -4.644  FC Loans  
Allowed  (25.383) (6.025)      (15.372) (4.280) 
  5.333***  6.737***  -1.273  1.220  FC Deposits  
Allowed      (1.659) (1.585) (5.603) (3.932) 
0.431* 0.336* 0.040  0.049 -0.573***  -0.377***  Time Trend 
(0.252) (0.196) (0.060) (0.060) (0.166) (0.125) 
-34.160* -12.231* 4.487** 4.734*  27.173***  9.668***  Constant 
(17.484)  (6.532) (2.227) (2.784) (9.556) (3.697) 
Country  Effects  33 33 76 76 31 31 
Observations  210 210 570 570 175 175 
R2 0.50   0.62   0.22  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dollar Credit/  
Total Credit 
Dollar Credit/  
Total Credit 








  IV OLS  IV OLS  IV OLS 
-34.001*** -9.374***  -2.626 4.036**  17.463*  3.467*  Intermediate 
Regime (10.178)  (2.565)  (7.609) (1.955) (9.449) (1.927) 
-12.115 -3.575  37.054***  9.662*** 3.154  8.258***  Floating 
Regime (11.730)  (3.217)  (9.796) (1.697) (6.975) (1.713) 
-0.079 -0.043 0.133*** 0.064*** 0.037  0.002  Trade/GDP 
(0.058) (0.036) (0.043) (0.018) (0.036) (0.017) 
-0.041 0.046  -0.002***  -0.002*** 0.072*  0.028  Inflation 
(0.078) (0.078) (0.001) (0.001) (0.042) (0.028) 
0.075*** 0.089*** 0.102*** 0.098*** 0.009  -0.003  Depreciation 
Maximum  (0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
0.057  -0.018 -0.002 0.038***  -0.038 -0.014  Interest 
Differentials  (0.062) (0.064) (0.032) (0.011) (0.034) (0.023) 
18.307*** 16.275***     -8.347*** -3.201*  FC Loans  
Allowed  (2.646) (2.123)     (3.126) (1.842) 
  3.547  12.494***  13.374***  3.682  FC Deposits  
Allowed    (2.874)  (1.223)  (4.857)  (2.459) 
1.140** 0.664***  -0.433  0.215** -0.641* -0.381***  Time Trend 
(0.475) (0.197) (0.301) (0.090) (0.376) (0.118) 
2.515 -2.895  -6.860**  -9.747*** -0.726  5.954*  Constant 
(5.594) (4.537) (3.103) (2.454) (5.277) (3.219) 








Observations  189 210 465 570 154 175 
R-squared  0.32 0.53 0.21 0.52   0.16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Instruments in 2SLS: terms-of-trade changes, land area, intermediate and floating regime for earliest year available (usually 1974). 
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Table 8 
IV Regressions with Fitted Probabilities as Instruments 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dollar Credit/  
Total Credit 










  IV OLS  IV OLS  IV OLS 
-71.884** -9.374*** 30.685  4.036** 31.175**  3.467*  Intermediate 
Regime (35.647)  (2.565)  (18.896) (1.955)  (12.530) (1.927) 
-22.169 -3.575  40.893***  9.662*** 14.460*  8.258***  Floating 
Regime (23.517)  (3.217)  (10.939) (1.697)  (7.755)  (1.713) 
-0.171 -0.043 0.178***  0.064*** 0.072*  0.002  Trade/GDP 
(0.110) (0.036) (0.056) (0.018) (0.040) (0.017) 
-0.097 0.046  -0.002**  -0.002*** 0.094*  0.028  Inflation 
(0.105) (0.078) (0.001) (0.001) (0.050) (0.028) 
0.045 0.089***  0.093***  0.098*** 0.014  -0.003  Depreciation 
Maximum  (0.032) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) 
0.093  -0.018 -0.003 0.038***  -0.057 -0.014  Interest 
Differentials  (0.084) (0.064) (0.040) (0.011) (0.038) (0.023) 
21.976*** 16.275***     -9.554*** -3.201*  FC Loans  
Allowed  (4.740) (2.123)     (3.626) (1.842) 
  3.531  12.494***  16.962***  3.682  FC Deposits  
Allowed    (2.912)  (1.223)  (6.360)  (2.459) 
1.878* 0.664***  -0.756*  0.215** -1.247***  -0.381***  Time Trend 
(1.125) (0.197) (0.394) (0.090) (0.460) (0.118) 
12.862 -2.895 -10.120***  -9.747*** -2.479  5.954*  Constant 
(11.782)  (4.537) (3.840) (2.454) (6.613) (3.219) 








Observations  189 210 465 570 154 175 
R-squared   0.53  0.23  0.52   0.16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Explanatory variables in preliminary ordered probit regression: terms-of-trade changes, land area, exchange rate regime for earliest year available  (usually 1974).  
Instruments in 2SLS: Fitted probabilities of intermediate and floating regimes from preliminary ordered probit regression. 